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Abstract
Root is the administrative privilege on Android, which is however inaccessible on stock Android devices. Due to the desire
for privileged functionalities and the reluctance of rooting their devices, Android users seek for no-root approaches, which
provide users with part of root privileges without rooting their devices. Existing no-root approaches require users to launch a
separate service via Android Debug Bridge (ADB) on an Android device, which would perform user-desired tasks. However, it
is unusual for a third-party Android application to work with a separate native service via sockets, and it requires the application
developers to have extra knowledge such as Linux programming in application development. In this paper, we propose a feasible
no-root approach based on new functionalities added on Android, which creates no separate service but an ADB loopback. To
ensure such no-root approach is not misused in a proactive instead of reactive manner, we examine its dark side. We find out that
while this approach makes it easy for no-root applications to work, it may lead to a “permission explosion,” which enables any
third-party application to attain shell permissions beyond its granted permissions. The permission explosion can further lead to
exploits including privacy leakage, account takeover, application UID abuse, and user input inference. A practical experiment is
carried out to evaluate the situation in the real world, which shows that many real-world applications from Google Play and four
third-party application markets are indeed vulnerable to these exploits. To mitigate the dark side of the new no-root approach
and make it more suitable for users to adopt, we identify the causes of the exploits, and propose a permission-based solution.
We also provide suggestions to application developers and application markets on how to prevent these exploits.
Keywords:, Android, Root, No-Root Approach, Permission Explosion, Android Debug Bridge (ADB), Exploits Analysis
1. Introduction
Android devices are popular in recent years, dominating 78% of the market share in the first quarter of
2015 [1]. As an operating system, Android has 23 main versions (i.e., API levels) since the initial release
in September 2008. While all versions are in use nowadays, the later Android versions from API level
15 to 22 take up to 95.7% in the distribution of Android devices according to the official statistics [2].
Android is a Linux-based system with discretionary access control enforcement. Root access, which
is part of traditional Linux systems, is blocked on stock Android devices for security reasons. If users
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would like to gain a complete control over their Android devices with administrative permissions, they
could root their devices at their own risks, such as device bricking, warranty turning void, and malware
breaching security protections.
To avoid the risks of rooting their Android devices, users turn to no-root approaches which enable
them to attain their desired permissions but without rooting their devices. The motivation of using such
no-root approaches might be strong since Android devices do not always provide all easy-to-use but
desperately needed features. For example, popularly desired features such as screen capture, wireless
tether, and application backup are not available before Android 4.0 for normal users. It is a natural choice
for users to resort to no-root approaches for the desired features if they do not want to risk rooting their
devices. It is notable that even some of the features are added to the newer versions, users are still fond
of no-root applications either because of the user-friendly interfaces and good user experiences or the
continuation of user’s habit. For example, Helium [3], which provides no-root data backup service, is still
popular after Android provides backup service after version 4.0. Consequently, some popular no-root
applications [3,4,5,6], have achieved millions of downloads and high reputations in Google Play.
The existing no-root applications [3,4,5,6,7,8] are primarily based on the power of Android Debug
Bridge (ADB) [9]. ADB is the official command-line debugging tool for Android. It wraps a set of
protocols for debugging jobs, including file transfer, command execution, and other necessary testing
tools. The existing no-root approach requires a USB-cable connection between a development computer
and a target Android device, through which a user may use ADB commands on the development
computer to launch a separate executable program as background service on the target device. Since
the background service is started by ADB, it inherits the ADB privileges which are originally assigned
to ADB for debugging purposes. The background service can be designed such that it responds to the
user’s requests made from certain no-root applications running on the target device and performs certain
privileged tasks which the no-root applications are not authorized to perform.
However, it is unusual for an Android application (hereinafter, “app” for short) to work with a separate
native service by communicating via sockets. It requires app developers to have extra knowledge such
as Linux programming so as to develop the separate native service. In this paper, we propose a feasible
no-root approach leveraging the new ADB functionality provided on Android. This no-root approach has
its advantage compared to the other no-root approaches in that it creates an ADB loopback instead of a
separate native service. After the ADB loopback is created, a no-root app on the target device can run as
a debugger to execute ADB commands in the TCP mode, as long as it has the internet permission.
Though we have not found any wild sample using this new no-root approach, it may appear in the
market at any time in any form, e.g., malicious apps pretending to be no-root apps. To ensure that such
no-root approach is not misused in a proactive instead of reactive manner, we examine the dark side
of this approach, and find out that it can be potentially exploited to launch many serious attacks. In
particular, it may lead to a “permission explosion,” which enables any third-party app with the internet
permission to attain all shell permissions beyond its granted permissions. Once an ADB loopback is set
up, it may be misused by any internet-enabled apps running on the user’s device due to the permission
explosion.
While it is well known that ADB is powerful and it may lead to many attacks due to its debug privilege,
it is not clear before about the impact and prevalence of such attacks. We reveal that the attacks can be
launched from an app on a standalone victim device instead of on a development computer connected
to the victim device. We examine typical attacks exploiting this no-root approach, including privacy
leakage, account takeover, application UID abuse, and user input inference. Based on the attacks we
Cheng et al. / A Study on a Feasible No-Root Approach on Android 3
Android Device
ADB DeamonUSB
Development Computer
ADB Client
ADB Server
ADB Binary
Figure 1. The ADB architecture.
identified, we evaluate the vulnerabilities that can cause such attacks on an app dataset collected from
Google Play and third-party markets. It shows that many real-world apps are vulnerable to these attacks.
To avoid the exploits brought by the no-root approach, we discuss the causes of the exploits and suggest
how to mitigate them. The root cause of the exploits is the ADB loopback, which is further due to the
availability of the ADB client and the TCP mode of ADB connection on Android devices. We reported the
issue to Google security team. The latest Android 6.0 takes action to remove ADB client and ADB server
to avoid the attacks. While it would be a simple solution to block ADB loopback in the future versions
of Android, it is not ideal due to sacrificing much benefit/convenience of ADB debugging and no-root
apps. To address this problem, we propose an alteration permission-based solution, which introduces
no significant change to the current security mechanism on Android, but adds one more permission to
control the use of ADB. Except for the permission-based solution on the Android’s side, we also provide
suggestions to app developers and app markets, since it is observed in our analysis that their negligence
contributes a big part to exposing apps to the dark-side exploits.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the background knowledge on
ADB and no-root apps. Section 3 presents a new feasible no-root approach based on ADB loopback,
and describes the permission explosion it may cause. Section 4 provides details on typical exploits on
the dark side of ADB loopback, including privacy leakage, account takeover, application UID abuse, and
user input inference. Section 5 discusses the causes of the exploits, proposes a permission-based solution,
and suggests to app developers and app markets on how to mitigate the exploits. Section 6 summarizes
the related work, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Background
2.1. ADB
ADB is a debug system for Android that allows developers to connect development computers
and Android devices (or emulators). Developers can debug Android devices on separate development
computers equipped with other operating systems via ADB. As shown in Figure 1, ADB includes three
components, i.e., ADB client, ADB server, and ADB daemon. In practice, ADB server is implemented
in the same binary as ADB client. A developer issues an ADB command via the ADB client on a
development computer. The ADB server on the development computer, passes the command from ADB
client to the ADB daemon which runs on a target Android device. When the response of the ADB
command is ready, it passes back to the developer along the same route. Before debugging, there is a
switch to be enabled in the Settings→Developer options.
Taking security into consideration, the debugging connection is performed with RSA authentication
since Android 4.2.2. On these new versions, an Android device authenticates a development computer
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it is connected to by verifying the RSA signature of the development computer. In addition to the
authentication, ADB connection requires a manual confirmation. Each time a development computer
requests to connect, there’s a pop-up dialog on the connected Android device showing the MD5 hash
of the RSA public key of the development computer which the user can use to confirm the approval of
debugging from this development computer. The confirmation is to make sure that the debugger indeed
has the access to the target device, capable of unlocking the device and responding to the pop-up dialog
correctly. The confirmation dialog could be also waived, once “Always allow from this computer” has
been checked during the confirmation of the connection from this computer.
ADB capability can be categorized into two parts: ADB commands and shell commands. ADB
commands fulfil the functionalities for debugging purpose, such as device connection, app (un)installing,
data transfer, and shell starting. Shell commands can be used after the shell starting, when a shell user,
whose UID is 2000 on Android, is born with shell permissions. The permissions for the shell user are
listed in Table 7 in Appendix. The majority of shell permissions have protection levels higher than
“dangerous.” Any permissions at “signature” level or “signatureOrSystem” level are either hidden or
not for use by third-party apps, and such permissions account for more than half (43 out of 65) of
the shell permissions. High-level shell permissions are necessary for debugging as debugging requires
close inspection and precise control of system status and resources. It is because of ADB’s powerful
debugging functionalities and high-level permissions that we need to make sure that ADB is not misused
for malicious purposes.
2.2. No-Root Applications
ADB is commonly adopted by existing no-root apps during their preprocessing [3,4,5,7,8]. The
preprocessing usually includes two manual operations. The first is to connect the Android device to a
development computer and switch on the debug mode in the Settings→Developer options. The second is
to run a provisioned enabler on the development computer which has been downloaded separately from
a no-root app’s website. To understand the purpose of using an enabler, we introduce a typical enabler
script, which is shown in Listing 1. In Listing 1, “nservice” denotes the native service that performs
a target task which requires certain high-level permissions. The executable of this service is pushed
to the Android device using a command “adb push” (Line 2), and its access permission is changed to
“executable” for all users (Line 3). Then, the service is started by ADB shell (Line 4) so that it inherits
the shell permissions for exercising some privileged functionalities such as screen shot. After that, the
no-root app which directly interacts with users, is able to work by delegating some of its tasks to the
running service through sockets.
Listing 1 A typical enabler script in existing no-root approach.
1 adb wait-for-device
2 adb push ./nservice /data/local/nservice
3 adb shell chmod 777 /data/local/nservice
4 adb shell /data/local/nservice &
5 adb kill-server
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Figure 2. ADB loopback.
3. A Feasible No-root Approach
In contrast to the existing approach, whose privilege resides in a separate service, we propose a feasible
no-root approach that requires no separate service but attains the full shell capability. It achieves no-root
via ADB loopback which works on 95.7% of the distribution of Android devices [2].
3.1. ADB Loopback
An Android device from API level 15 to 22 can debug another Android device, because these new
versions have introduced the ADB components, which are originally on development computers, to
Android systems, i.e., ADB client and ADB server (shown as the dashed ADB Binary in Figure 2). In
addition, the connection mode is not limited to using USB cable. A TCP mode newly added since version
4.0 allows a development computer using TCP links to connect to the target Android device (shown as
the dashed TCP connection between the development computer and the Android device in Figure 2).
However, an inconspicuous side consequence is that an Android device gains the capability of debugging
itself by connecting its ADB server to its local ADB daemon (shown as the dashed ADB loopback in
Figure 2). Based on such ADB loopback, we propose a feasible no-root approach.
Similar to existing no-root approaches, this approach takes a preprocessing. What a user needs to do in
this preprocessing is to run a script which we name as “Looper” on a development computer connected to
the target Android device via a USB cable. Looper can work on any platform that supports Android ADB.
Listing 2 shows the core snippet of Looper. First of all, Looper turns on the TCP mode at port 5555 on the
target Android device (Line 1). Then, Looper kills the existing ADB server on the target Android device
in case it is running (Line 2) and restarts it, setting “/sdcard” as HOME folder (Line 3). The purpose of
setting “/sdcard”1 as HOME folder is to guarantee that Looper should work as well on Android 4.2.2
and higher. This is because since Android 4.2.2, ADB introduces the RSA authentication for an ADB
daemon on an Android device to authenticate an ADB server on a development computer. In our case of
ADB loopback, the ADB server is located on the same Android device hosting the ADB daemon. When
an ADB server requests to connect to local ADB daemon, it generates and stores the RSA key pair on
the Android device in a sub-folder of HOME folder (“HOME”/.android/) for authentication. Note that
the HOME folder by default is “/data” which is inaccessible to the shell user. Therefore, we change the
HOME folder to shell-user-accessible “/sdcard”, so that the RSA key pair of the ADB server can be
stored successfully for later authentication. The confirmation dialogs showing the hash values of the RSA
keys of the development computer (while changing ADB connection mode to TCP mode) and the target
Android device itself (while establishing ADB loopback locally) will be prompted correspondingly after
1We use “/sdcard” folder for brief illustration. It can be set to any folder that can be accessed by the shell user.
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Line 1 and Line 3 in Listing 2. The confirmation dialog only pops up once during the establishment of
ADB debug connection. There would be no further popping up during the use of no-root apps. Though
the confirmation dialogs are only popped up during the preprocessing, when a user is responding to a
confirmation dialog, (s)he is encouraged to check “Always allow from this computer”, in which “this
computer” refers to his/her computer or Android device. This allowance would waive the confirmation
dialog when an ADB connection is established from the user’s computer or Android device again.
Listing 2 The core snippet of Looper2.
1 adb tcpip 5555
2 adb shell adb kill-server
3 adb shell HOME=/sdcard adb start-server &
After ADB loopback is established, a no-root app with the permission to connect to local TCP ports
can play the role of a debugger. The permissions of ADB that are intended for remote development
computers are now available on stand-alone Android devices for such apps. As a result, by using ADB
loopback, no-root apps can perform privileged tasks as long as they can connect to local TCP ports.
3.2. Permission Explosion
No-root has always been a double-edged sword3. Though we have not found any wild samples using
this no-root approach, they may appear in the market at any time in any form (e.g., a malicious app
pretending to be a no-root app) since they are easy to implement. Once the no-root approach via ADB
loopback is set up, any installed app with the permission to connect to the local ports may exploit the
ADB loopback and attain shell privileges.
Recall on Android, permission control is the basic security mechanism. Sensitive resources and
system functions are all protected by permissions. Apps request for permissions explicitly during
installation. The grant procedure varies according to the protection levels of requested permissions.
There are four protection levels for permissions, which are “normal”, “dangerous”, “signature”, and
“signatureOrSystem.” The normal level permissions are automatically granted as they are considered
harmless. The permissions listed on screen during installation are mostly at dangerous level, which
should be approved by users explicitly. The signature level permissions are granted only if the requesting
app is signed with the same certificate as the app that declares the permissions. Specifically, for the
permissions defined by Android system, the certificate of the app that declares the permissions is
the system certificate. The signatureOrSystem level permissions are granted either the requesting app
satisfies the grant condition of signature level permissions or the app is built in the Android system
image. Hence, the permissions requested by an app represent the app’s capability. There are already many
solutions proposed to model an app’s capability through permission analysis, based on which advanced
security mechanisms can be developed [11,12,13].
A “permission explosion” happens when an Android app plays the role of a debugger and attains shell
privileges by ADB loopback. The only permission needed is “android.permission.INTERNET”,
2In Looper, it must be done on a development computer to change ADB connection mode to TCP mode (Line 1), whereas
the rest could be alternatively executed on the target Android device without prefix “adb shell.”
3It is shown that the existing no-root approach could lead to privacy leakage due to the insecure socket communication
between the no-root app and its native service [10].
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which is the permission needed for connecting to the local ports so as to establish the ADB loopback.
On an Android device that has adopted the no-root approach via ADB loopback, an app can act as a
debugger to issue ADB or shell commands by invoking ADB client on the device. The commands are
passed to ADB daemon via the TCP connection. It is the ADB daemon (adbd), which runs in shell
UID, that truly performs the privileged operations. Therefore, when Android checks whether the process
performing privileged operations has certain permission, the check is enforced on ADB daemon instead
of the calling app without that permission. In this case, an app only with the internet permission can
obtain all capabilities under the protection of shell permissions including the permissions at the signature
level and signatureOrSystem level. The permission declaration in AndroidManifest.xml no longer
reflects the whole capability of any app with the internet permission. Consequently, any existing analysis
and protection mechanisms based on app permissions would be in vain.
It is known that the shell privileges are just part of the total control of Android. What permission
explosion makes things worse is, however, the capability of misusing the package (un)installation
permission which could (un)install APK files silently even when “Unknown sources” is disabled. This
would enable malwares to settle down on target devices. With this capability, there is no need for a
malware to request for all necessary but suspicious permissions since it can install more malwares silently
and conclude with them in attacks. Collusion with sound job division [14] is hard to detect based on
analysing app individually [15]. In addition, this capability makes it possible to replace a benign app with
a malicious one displaying similar icon and UI in app phishing [16], which may steal users’ input such
as account credentials without users’ awareness.
The no-root approach we propose is easy to implement, and it meets the user’s requirement for no-root.
We need to ensure that this no-root approach is not misused, since an app using this no-root approach
may come to market at any time. Thus, it is necessary to estimate the potential threats to other existing
apps from such no-root approach.
4. Exploits on the Dark Side
The no-root approach may lead to permission explosion which is due to the locally available ADB
functionalities. While it is well known that ADB is powerful and may lead to many attacks due to
its debug privilege, it is not clear before about the exact impact and prevalence of such attacks. We
investigate these attacks for the purpose of preventing them proactively. In particular, we set up a no-root
environment and discover that the no-root approach can be potentially exploited to launch many serious
attacks, including privacy leakage, account takeover, application UID abuse and user input inference.
Moreover, we evaluate on a real-world dataset to see how prevalent the exploits are. According to the
evaluation results, we would say that some of the attacks are not merely due to the permission explosion.
The negligence of apps developers and app markets is another important reason.
4.1. Adversary Model & Experiment Setup
The scenario of our investigation is that a user has a device which is not rooted. (S)he has installed
a no-root app that adopts our no-root approach on his/her Android device for the purpose of enjoying
privileged functions without rooting the device. We investigate the potential threats from a malicious
app only with the internet permission, i.e., how much the other installed apps on the same device would
suffer from the malicious one in terms of security and privacy.
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Table 1
The distribution of our application dataset.
Markets #
Google Play 26,548
Android Freeware (US) 3,543
Anzhi Market (CN) 59,474
Eoe Market (CN) 4,330
Slide Me (US) 6,475
After identifying the threats, we test the vulnerabilities causing the threats on a recently collected
dataset to find out how prevalent the exploits are among real-world apps. Table 1 shows about 100,000
apps we collected between June and December 2014 from Google Play and four third-party app markets
from United States (US) and China (CN), including Android Freeware (US), Anzhi Market (CN), Eoe
Market (CN), and Slide Me (US).
Two Android devices without root privilege, i.e., Nexus 4 and Nexus 5, which have been preprocessed
by Looper, are used in our experiments. It is verified that this new no-root approach works on the Android
versions ranging from 4.0.4 to 5.1.1.
4.2. Privacy Leakage via Application Logs
Android provides a logging system for collecting and inspecting debugging outputs. The access to
log messages is regulated by callers’ UIDs. Normal users, i.e., third-party apps without root privilege,
can only access the logs related to themselves, whereas the shell user is not limited by such restriction.
Therefore, when an app attains the shell privileges via the no-root approach we propose, it can get all
system-wide logs using logcat which is the official tool for dumping log messages.
Since the system-wide logs are readable, we investigate whether a malicious app can obtain any
sensitive information from the logs of other apps. In fact, Android documents suggest that logs should
be managed according to their types. The logs of verbose type should never be compiled into an app
except during development, and the logs of debug type can be compiled in but should be stripped at
runtime [17]. The negligence of logging informative data has also been pointed out previously [18].
If there is no sensitive data being logged, a malicious app can get nothing even with the capability of
dumping log messages. We are interested to know what the situation is in app markets nowadays. Do app
developers remove their logs as required? The answer is “no” according to our investigation.
We need to clarify in this case what information is sensitive. We classify the sensitive information on
mobile devices into four categories, i.e., device parameters, app account information, user interaction
indications, and others. The first category is the device parameters which reflect the characteristics
of devices, including Android version, device model, manufacturer, root status, and SIM card related
information such as phone number, IMEI, and IMSI. The second category, i.e., app account information,
is on the application level, which includes account ID, account credential, and personal profile. The third
category is the user interaction indications, which indicate the operations a user performs at different
time, such as opening an activity and inputting a password. In addition, geographic information (e.g.,
location, latitude/longitude, and country code) and network status (e.g., SSID, gateway IP, and network
quality) are classified into the last category along with other information.
To evaluate the risk of leaking sensitive information against the privacy leakage exploit, we select top
10 account-sensitive apps from the top free list from Google Play and Anzhi Market, respectively. We run
these 20 target apps on our experiment device, and test them manually according to their functionalities.
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Table 2
The sensitive information collected from log messages of the top free account-sensitive applications.
Applications Deviceparameters
Account
information
User
interactions Others
org.mozilla.firefox (G) X X - -
com.tencent.mtt (A) - X - -
com.taobao.taobao (A) X X - -
com.sinovatech.unicom.ui (A) X X X XLocation
com.skype.polaris (G) X - - XUser agent string, country code
com.tencent.mobileqq (A) - - -
XGateway IP, SQL statement,
established connections,
network info and quality test
com.google.android.youtube (G) X - - XCountry code, network info
com.facebook.katana (G) - X - XGateway IP, GPS data
com.cleanmaster.mguard (A) X - X -
com.snapchat.android (G) - - X -
co.vine.android (G) - - X -
We test top 10 free account-sensitive applications from Google Play (G) and Anzhi Market (A), respectively.
Only those with sensitive information in logs are shown.
“X” means that the corresponding category of sensitive information is spotted in logs.
The observation on the messages logged by these apps begins from the time when they are launched,
and lasts the entire runtime till there’s no further operation. Experimental results show that 11 of the 20
top-ranked apps log some sensitive data. The apps with respect to their logged sensitive information are
shown in Table 2. According to the location of logging code (i.e., the code generating logs), we categorize
the logs of sensitive information into two types.
The first type is logged by apps themselves. One example of such app is “com.sinovatech.unicom.ui”
which is the service app of China Unicom4. The logs of this app contain much sensitive information. User
account information is spotted, including phone numbers, account balances, monthly real-time costs,
and bonus points. Besides, user interactions are recorded. For example, each time a user navigates to
the activity for password reset, a log message is recorded indicating the title of the activity - “password
reset.”
The second type of logs is from third-party SDKs. For example, Snapchat [19] and Vine [20] both use
Flurry [21] SDK to help their developers to know how the apps are used by users according to accurate
usage data analytics. Flurry defines log APIs, including FlurryAgent.setLogEnabled() and
FlurryAgent.setLogLevel(), for developers to monitor the runtime behaviours of apps during
developing and debugging. It is observed that due to the developers’ improper use of FlurryAgent,
it logs some of the user operations when a user interacts with an activity shown on screen. One of such
cases, which happens during registration, is demonstrated in Listing 3. It can be inferred from its logs
that Snapchat first focuses on the email field (Line 2), and then the edit on this filed begins (Line 3).
After that, it focuses on the password filed waiting for inputs (Line 4). Once a user starts inputting his/her
password, it immediately outputs the corresponding log (Line 5). Even though there’s no direct leakage
of email or password, the information about focusing and editing can be used by a malicious app to
know the accurate time of entering usernames and passwords, and such accurate time is important for
launching other attacks such as keylogger attacks.
4China Unicom is one of the largest mobile carriers in China, which operates with about 300 million subscribers.
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Listing 3 FlurryAgent logs in Snapchat showing user interactions during registration.
1 W/FlurryAgent(20495): Event count started: R01_BEGIN_REGISTRATION
2 W/FlurryAgent(20495): Event count started: R01_FOCUS_ON_EMAIL
3 W/FlurryAgent(20495): Event count started: R01_EDITED_EMAIL
4 W/FlurryAgent(20495): Event count started: R01_FOCUS_ON_PASSWORD
5 W/FlurryAgent(20495): Event count started: R01_EDITED_PASSWORD
4.3. Account Takeover via ADB Backup
On Android, a third-party app stores private data in its private folder, the access to which by other
third-party apps is prohibited so as to avoid account takeover. A private folder is thus only accessible
to Android system and its owner app. Even the shell privileges cannot access such data directly. We
show that however, there is an alternative way to achieve account takeover without knowing any account
credentials.
ADB backup is an ADB mechanism which performs the backup and restore task on Android. It can
be used to back up all the data files in an app’s private data folder, including databases and shared
preferences, to a single file5. This backup is enabled on the condition that the application attribute
“allowBackup” is set to “true”, which by default is. A good use of ADB backup is to backup apps’ data
and then restore them on the same device after system upgrade or data corruption. However, on the dark
side, it is possible to restore the backup data on a different device.
Account credentials are rarely stored in plain text locally, thus it is of little use to obtain the data in
apps’ private folders. Nevertheless, when restored on a different device, an app’s account login status
could be kept the same as they were on the former device. Hence, a malicious app can take over other
apps’ private data protected in the account circuitously by backing up target apps and then restoring them
on a fully-controlled device. In such case, even the attacker does not know the account credential, (s)he
can perform any operation to the target app with a logged-in account on the restored device. To avoid
becoming a victim, an app should detect any new runtime device and protect its private data accordingly,
e.g., logging out of the account if a different runtime device is detected. In the following, we investigate
how many real-world apps in our collected dataset allow backup, and whether some most popular apps
enforce any protection on their private data when restored on a different device.
In the first part of our investigation, we focus on the usage of “allowBackup” in the dataset we
collected from multiple markets (Table 1). The results are shown in Table 3. We observe that most apps
do not set “false” explicitly to the backup attribute either by intention or ignorance, which means that
they are potential victims of the above-mentioned account takeover exploit. A small portion of apps set
“allowBackup” to “false”, which accounts for 6.95% in Google Play dataset. This proportion is lower in
alternative market datasets; the lowest proportion is 0.01% in Anzhi Market. It is both reasonable to set
“allowBackup” to either “true” or “false.” However, it is critical for an app with true (or default) value in
“allowBackup” to enforce some necessary protection on the backup data.
In the second part of our investigation, we focus on whether some popular apps that allow backup
would lead to account takeover. Unlike the first investigation which can be performed in a large scale,
this investigation requires a manual analysis of a small number of apps so as to verify account takeover.
5The file containing backup data is not protected by default. A user can choose to use password to encrypt backup file by
setting Developer options→Desktop backup password. In this section, we assume that the setting is by default, i.e., with no
password.
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Table 3
The usage of “allowBackup” in our application dataset.
Google Play Anzhi Market Eoe Market Android Freeware Slide Me
allowBackup True False True False True False True False True False
By definition 8,778 1,846 29 8 1,876 234 1,052 165 1,967 223
By default 15,924 - 59,437 - 2,220 - 2,326 - 4,285 -
Table 4
Data accessible status for mail applications after being backed-up on one device and restored on a different device.
Applicatoin Account In/Outbox Draft
com.fsck.k9 X X X
com.my.mail 7∗ 7 7
com.outlook.Z7 X X X
com.yahoo.mobile.client.android.mail 7 7 7
ru.mail.mailapp X X X
“X” means accessible, “7” otherwise.
∗Username is obtained.
In this investigation, we choose two categories of apps for which it is important to protect users’ data
against account takeover (i.e., mail apps and browser apps), and the most popular apps in these categories
(i.e., top 5 apps). Specifically, we target at the top 5 free mail apps (i.e., K-9 Mail, myMail, Microsoft
Outlook, Yahoo Mail, and Mail.Ru) and top 5 free browser apps (i.e., Chrome Browser, Opera browser
for Android, UC Browser, Dolphin Browser for Android, and Firefox Browser for Android) in Google
Play. The values of the backup attribute show that all of the 10 apps can be backed up.
The mail apps are used for handling emails, such as logging in, sending/receiving mails and saving
drafts. We inspect into account login status, inbox/outbox mails, and draft content after restoring a user’s
account data to a different device. Table 4 shows that three out of five mail apps keep their accounts
logged in on the different device to which they are restored as they were logged in on the original device.
In such case, the whole account data is accessible and arbitrary mailing operations can be performed on
the restored device, which leads to the takeover of their mail accounts. In contrast, the other two apps
have adopted certain protections, both of which require re-login after being restored on a different device.
A minor difference is that Yahoo Mail needs both username and password to complete the re-login,
whereas myMail prompts the username as a hint and requests the password only.
For browser apps, we care about the data related to user privacy and account safety, including browser
account login status, saved passwords (for other websites), history, bookmarks, and downloads. Table 5
shows whether the above-mentioned data is accessible by an attacker after restoring a user’s account data
to a different Android device. History data and bookmarks are accessible for all five browser apps on
the different device. Although no downloaded file is available, because the “Downloads” folder, which
is the recommended location to store downloaded files on Android, is not within the browsers’ backup
scale (i.e., private data folders), two of the five browsers still leak valuable information about users’
downloads by either filenames or URLs. Except Chrome, all tested browsers that support account login
fail in detecting the change of runtime device, and keep their accounts logged in on the restored device.
A more serious problem is that some browsers provide the choice of saving login credentials for users.
Such browsers can fill in the login forms of visited websites with saved usernames and passwords.
In our testing, four browsers (i.e., Chrome Browser, Opera browser for Android, Dolphin Browser for
Android, and Firefox Browser for Android) provide this functionality. Except for Dolphin Browser (i.e.,
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Table 5
Data accessible status for browser applications after being backed-up on one device and restored on a different device.
Application Account Saved pwds History Bookmarks Downloads
com.android.chrome 7 X X X 7
com.opera.browser - X X X X, filename
com.UCMobile.intl - - X X 7
mobi.mgeek.TunnyBrowser X 7 X X X, filename and URL
org.mozilla.firefox X X X X 7
“X” means accessible, “7” otherwise, and “-” indicates no support for the function.
mobi.mgeek.TunnyBrowser), the other three browsers fill in web forms on the different device to which
they are restored with the account information saved on the original device. It is worth noting that the
auto-fill of saved passwords in Chrome still works, although Chrome has detected the different runtime
device and logged out of its account.
4.4. UID Abuse of Debuggable Applications
The application attribute “debuggable” defines whether an app can be debugged, even when running
on a device in user mode. During the app development, “debuggable” needs to be explicitly set to “true”;
however, sometimes it fails to be set back to “false” when the release version is produced. Any app
with true “debuggable” attribute value registers itself to ADB daemon by connecting to the local socket
@jdwp-control which is opened by ADB daemon. When a debugger requests for a connection to
a debuggable app, the ADB daemon is responsible for establishing such connection. This connection
is based on standard Java Debug Wire Protocol (JDWP), which is designed to be used in debugging
by the debugger to control the debuggable app and execute necessary testing code in the context of
the debuggable app. When a malicious app takes the role of the debugger on a stand-alone device,
which is the exact situation in the no-root environment with ADB loopback, it attains the full control
of the debuggable app and can run arbitrary code in the debuggable context with the same UID as the
debuggable app. In other words, the malicious debugger can exercise the debuggable app’s permissions
and access its sensitive data. As a result, Android access control based on UID is not effective in this
setting.
To mitigate this threat, it is prohibited to publish apps with the true “debuggable” value on Google
Play since late 2013. Unfortunately, according to our evaluation, the third-party markets still put apps on
shelves without enforcing any restriction on the debuggable attribute.
We investigate how many apps in our dataset (see Table 1) collected from Google Play and four
third-party app markets are subject to UID abuse by examining whether the “debuggable” attribute in
AndroidManifest.xml holds a true value. The usage of “debuggable” attribute in these apps is
shown in Table 6. It is discovered that Google Play still hosts a small portion of its published apps being
debuggable (1.67%). Even though Google Play’s prohibition of publishing debuggable apps is effective
since late 2013, the debuggable apps uploaded before that and never updated afterwards are still on
shelf. In the four third-party markets, the situation is not very optimistic. For example, 13.75% apps are
debuggable in Anzhi Market.
4.5. User Input Inference
User input inference is a way to capture user private information such as account credential. Previous
research targets on user input inference from various channels such as device sensors [22,23], the
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Table 6
The usage of “debuggable” in our application dataset.
Google Play Anzhi Market Eoe Market Android Freeware Slide Me
debuggable True False True False True False True False True False
By definition 444 3,868 8,175 6,009 229 474 84 511 112 1,382
By default - 22,236 - 45,290 - 3,627 - 2,948 - 4,981
clipboard [24][25], sound from voice response systems [26], screen captures [10], and indirect shoulder
surfing [27]. While the existing inference approaches can still work in no-root environment, a malicious
app in no-root environment can obtain more accurate information about user’s input, including the input
characters and the time of the input.
Inference of Input Characters. The characters that a user inputs on a touch-screen can be inferred
from knowing both the touch position on screen and the software keyboard layout.
First, let us consider the inference of touch positions. In Android, a touch screen registers the absolute
position of each click in its coordinates, i.e., ABS_MT_POSITION_X and ABS_MT_POSITION_Y.
There’s only one activity shown on screen each time. The dispatch destination of each click position
is supposed to be the app running on screen only. However, the no-root approach we propose makes
it feasible for another app on the same device to access directly to the touch coordinates using the
shell command getevent no matter it is running on screen or not. We set up an app running in
background which gets the coordinates of user clicks via getevent. Listing 4 shows the raw events
obtained by this app when a user neatly presses letter “a” using the English (US) Google Keyboard
with “QWERTY” layout on Nexus 5, where /dev/input/event1 represents the touch screen, and
the three hex numbers following a colon represent type, code, and value, respectively. For example, in
Lines 2 and 3, type ‘0003’ denotes an absolute event, followed by codes ‘0035’ and ‘0036’ denoting
X coordinate and Y coordinate, respectively, and followed by the coordinate value. It ensures accurate
inference of user input by parsing these raw events directly as the Android system does for the app
running on screen.
Listing 4 Raw events of pressing letter “a.”
1 /dev/input/event1: 0003 0039 0000005d
2 /dev/input/event1: 0003 0035 00000080
3 /dev/input/event1: 0003 0036 00000554
4 /dev/input/event1: 0003 003a 0000002d
5 /dev/input/event1: 0000 0000 00000000
6 /dev/input/event1: 0003 0039 ffffffff
7 /dev/input/event1: 0000 0000 00000000
Second, let us consider the inference of keyboard layout, whose varieties are introduced by different
vendors. Even for the input methods that endorse the same “QWERTY” layout, the position of each
key is slightly different due to the appearance adjustment by vendors. The information about the input
method (e.g., its name and whether it is invoked) is available using dumpsys which is another shell
command that becomes available to apps with the internet permission in no-root environment. As a result,
a malicious app obtains the combination of user click positions and the keyboard layout and thus the
input characters.
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Good Timing of Credential Input. From an attacker’s point of view, it is important to determine the
good timing at which a user is ready to input his/her account credentials to an app so as to capture the
user’s input of such information. This is because a screen touch happens frequently, but not every time
it means a valuable input to a malicious app. Detecting the good timing of user credential input would
enable a malicious app to know when to start inferring the input characters for user credentials.
Algorithm 1 illustrates our good timing detection algorithm in pseudo code. The good timing is a
logical variable which is detected to be true when the login activity of a target app is shown and an input
keyboard is invoked. The goodTiming being true indicates that the user is ready for inputting his/her
account credentials.
Algorithm 1 Good timing detection.
1: procedure GOODTIMINGDETECTION
2: goodTiming = false
3: while screenIsOn && targetOnScreen do
4: if activityHas2EditTexts then
5: if 2ndEditTextIsPwd then
6: while imeIsShown do
7: goodTiming = true
Login activities share a common pattern which can be used to detect them. A login activity normally
consists of at least two EditText fields for inputting a username and a password, respectively. Among
the two, the second EditText field conceals the password content by representing each input character
in a black dot or asterisk, as attribute inputType (one of the attributes of EditText) is set to
password-related by developers. Therefore, a login activity can be detected by seeing this pattern. A
malicious app in no-root environment can obtain the activity layout in XML using the shell command
uiautomator which is usually used in user interface tests. The layout describes an activity hierarchy
composed of a variety of layout widgets, each of which has its type (e.g., EditText) and many
attributes of this type (e.g., inputType). This activity layout, along with the information of whether
any input method is invoked which can be obtained using the shell command dumpsys, provides a
malicious app with all parameters used in Algorithm 1.
We test our good timing detection algorithm with the top 20 finance apps in Google Play. The
protection of users’ credentials is critical for these apps since any leakage may lead to financial loss.
These target apps are installed on the test device on which our good timing detection algorithm runs in
the background. Volunteers are recruited to operate on the device at will, e.g., playing games, browsing
websites, and logging in the target apps with provided accounts. For demonstration purpose, we add
one more component to the good timing detection service to take a screenshot using shell command
screencap when any good timing is detected for the input of users’ credentials. The screenshots are
stored with the filenames which are named according to the corresponding good timing timestamps. If
our detection algorithm is accurate, there should be a screenshot showing a login form with an input
keyboard invoked if and only if a volunteer is about to input an account credential in a target app. During
the experiment, all of the 20 apps have been invoked by volunteers. We obtain 15 apps’ screenshots in
the end. According to our further inspection, the other five apps do not support user login. It proves that
the good timing detection works perfectly for all 15 apps which support user login.
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5. Mitigation
In this section, we discuss how to prevent the no-root approach from being misused in a proactive
manner. All exploits presented in the previous section rely on ADB loopback, which can be set up due
to the availability of the ADB client and the TCP mode of ADB connection on Android. While it would
be a simple solution to block ADB loopback by removing TCP connection mode or ADB binary in the
future versions of Android, it is not ideal due to sacrificing much benefit/convenience provided by ADB
debugging and no-root apps. We thus propose a permission-based solution without blocking the ADB
loopback. We also provide suggestions to app developers and app markets on how to prevent the exploits.
5.1. Permission-based Solution
Once the ADB loopback is set up, a benign no-root app can access the ADB client (one of the ADB
components introduced in Section 2.1) to meet users’ requirements. However, malicious apps may abuse
ADB client, which helps them to access the resources beyond their granted permissions. The ADB
client cannot distinguish whether the calls are from benign no-root apps or malicious apps. All of the
exploits presented in this paper rely on unauthorised calls to ADB client from malicious third-party apps.
Consequently, the exploits can be mitigated by thwarting unauthorised calls to ADB client.
A preferred solution should mitigate the ADB loopback exploits while still making it work for benign
no-root apps. It is thus not an optimal choice to shut down the ADB loopback on Android. One possible
solution is to extend the existing Android permission mechanism properly without introducing too much
modification to it6.
In Android frameworks, a wide variety of permissions is defined to control the access to critical
resources such as equipped hardware resources, system API functions, and file systems. An app cannot
access any protected resources unless it has the required permissions. The enforcement of permission
checking is located at two different layers, including Framework layer and Linux kernel layer. The
checkpoints at the Framework layer mainly deal with the Android API callings to some sensitive
resources such as contacts. Other checkpoints in Linux kernel are responsible for checking file system
and network related permissions. Android assigns a unique Group ID (GID) to each type of permissions
that are checked in Linux kernel. If any permission is granted to an app, this app will include the
corresponding GID to its GIDs field which is a set of GIDs for each app maintained by system. When
the app requests to access any protected resource, the checkpoint in Linux kernel checks whether the app
has the required GID.
Since ADB is an open-sourced protocol, a third-party app can implement it and communicate
with ADB server as ADB client does. Previous research [30] suggests to verify whether the entity
communicating with ADB server is truly the system ADB client. It requires that only ADB client can
communicate with ADB server. In our solution, we focus more on how to protect the ADB client.
To prevent unauthorized calls to ADB client, we propose to add one extra permission to the current
permission system. In particular, we add android.permission.DEBUG_ADB to the permission
group DEVELOPMENT_TOOLS. To make this permission work, we need to declare it first as shown in
Listing 5. Due to the fact that ADB is not managed by any Android service manager, the checkpoint of
this permission should be located at the Linux kernel layer. It thus requires a unique GID for permission
6We assume that the permission mechanism of the current Android system is effective as designed. We do not address any
problem on current permission-based mechanism, such as permission re-delegation [28] or how users treat the permission
declaration [29]. It is out of the scope of this paper.
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checking in Linux kernel. In Listing 6, we show how to map this new permission to a GID named
adb_debug. After that, we need to assign a GID number to the ADB debug permission in Listing 7.
Till now, the new permission for ADB debug is declared, and it has its own GID which can be used
during the enforcement of permission.
Listing 5 Declare a new permission.
<!-- in file /platform/frameworks/base/core/res/ AndroidManifest.xml -->
<permission
android:name="android.permission.DEBUG_ADB"
android:permissionGroup="android.permission-group. DEVELOPMENT_TOOLS"
android:protectionLevel="dangerous"
android:description="Allow app to access ADB."
android:label="debug via ADB" />
Listing 6 Map the permission to a new GID.
<!-- in file /platform/frameworks/base/data/etc/platform.xml -->
<permission name="android.permission.DEBUG_ADB">
<group gid="adb_debug" />
</permission>
Listing 7 Assign a new GID number.
/* in file system/core/include/private/android_filesystem_ config.h */
#define AID_DEBUG_ADB 3009
static const struct android_id_info android_ids[] =
{
{ "adb_degbug", AID_DEBUG_ADB, },
...
}
Having defined the new permission, we need to specify the constraint related to this permission
for ADB client. We add a permission check function at the beginning of ADB source code so that
the DEBUG_ADB permission is checked whenever the ADB client is called. We check whether the
calling process has the DEBUG_ADB permission. As mentioned previously, the permission check in
Linux layer depends on the GIDs of the calling process, which should include the AID_DEBUG_ADB
for the DEBUG_ADB permission. In order to obtain the GIDs of the calling process, we read the
/proc/pid/status file indexed by pid and get the Groups field. The Groups field is a set of
integers each of which indicates a group the process includes, i.e., a permission of the process. If there
is no “3009”, the GID number of AID_DEBUG_ADB, in the calling app’s Groups field, the access
request is denied. However, if Groups field shows that the calling process indeed has the ADB debug
permission, we do not allow it to access ADB immediately. A skilful malicious app without the ADB
debug permission may call the ADB client by circuitously invoking function system(cmd) or issuing
command sh -c cmd. In this situation, the calling process of ADB client is the bash that directly
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launches ADB client, rather than the app itself. Therefore, our permission check function is applied to all
the parent processes along the call chain till zygote which is the parent process that spawns all apps on
Android, or reaching the process with parent process ID 0 without passing by zygote which means the
calling is directly from shell or system. If any process along the call chain does not have the ADB debug
permission, the permission check for the ADB debug permission is terminated and the call is denied.
We also need to maintain the original usage of ADB for shell user. We declare the use of DEBUG_ADB
permission for shell user in its manifest file /platform/frameworks/base/packages/Shell/
AndroidManifest.xml, so that shell can get this permission and face no security exception when
debugging. Similarly, this permission is also granted to the system user and the root user. It is worth
noting that this solution modifies neither definitions nor enforcement of any other permissions; therefore,
it affects no apps but the ones accessing ADB client.
Once the above permission-based solution takes effect, any app which requires access to ADB client
should require for android.permission.DEBUG_ADB in its manifest file. An app cannot invoke
ADB client on an Android device unless the user of the device explicitly grants the permission during
the app’s installation. An app which positions itself as a benign no-root app or development tool
must convince the user to grant the ADB debug permission to it. The mitigation solution introduces
insignificant change to the current Android system. It prevents any app without the DEBUG_ADB
permission from invoking the ADB client, and thus mitigates the dark-side exploits of the no-root
approach based on ADB loopback by thwarting unauthorized access to the ADB client.
5.2. Suggestions to Developers and Markets
Besides the permission-based solution which can be enforced on the Android side, we also give some
suggestions for app developers and app markets based on our observation that the negligence from both
sides may lead to exploits.
On the app developers’ side, proper coding and configuration would help protect apps against some
malicious exploits. It is common that app developers sometimes insert logging code or use logging APIs
from SDKs in their apps in the development phase for testing purposes. Probably due to negligence,
some of them leave the logging code without change when they release their final products. In the no-root
environment with ADB loopback, such apps are subject to the privacy leakage exploit. This exploit can be
mitigated by cleaning the logging code before releasing their apps. Besides cleaning unnecessary logging
code, app developers need to check for the configuration of the application attribute “allowBackup.” It
is reasonable to set the value either to “true” or “false”. If it is set to “true” (explicitly or by default),
necessary protection must be enforced on the backup data, e.g., logging out of account once the app is
restored on a different device; otherwise, the app is subject to the account takeover exploit. Lastly, app
developers should check for the misconfiguration of application attribute “debuggable.” If it is set to
“true” in the development phase, it should be set to “false” in the released version so as to mitigate the
application UID abuse exploit.
On the app markets’ side, it is suggested that app markets enforce effective vetting processes. Google
Play has set up an example of using its bouncer [31], which checks for malicious operations and certain
vulnerabilities in each app submitted to Google Play and suggests whether or not Google Play should
accept the app. One of the jobs that bouncer do is to ensure that debuggable apps should not appear
in the market since late 2013. This would help mitigate the application UID abuse exploit due to the
permission explosion. On the other hand, we discover that several popular third-party markets, including
Android Freeware, Anzhi Market, Eoe Market, and Slide Me, still host a considerable portion of apps
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that can be debugged. They may consider to improve their vetting systems to catch up with Google Play
in prohibiting the debuggable apps. Besides blocking debuggable apps, we suggest that Android markets
should check for the apps with debug or verbose logging code so as to avoid leaking sensitive information
in logs.
5.3. Discussion
Impact of SEAndroid. Since Android version 4.4, SEAndroid is enforced by default. Our no-root
approach may not trigger the existing constraints from SEAndroid unless specific SEAndroid rules are
defined so as to restrict the use of TCP-mode connections and debugging capabilities. The reason is
that our no-root approach leverages on a side effect of combining two legitimate features introduced
in Android 4.0 and later versions, including the connection channel via TCP mode and the debugging
capability of mobile system. After the establishment of ADB loopback, an application can serve as a
legitimate debugger and use the normal ADB functions. It is verified that our no-root approach works
on Nexus 5, Android 5.1 with SEAndroid enforced. To prevent the exploits of our no-root approach,
SEAndroid rules should be defined to distinguish regular use from misuse of ADB. However, this is
challenging since it may not be always possible to distinguish between benign no-root apps and untrusted
third-party apps by Android platform provider or device manufacturers. Note that SEAndroid policies
are defined by Android platform provider, which can be modified and extended by device manufacturers.
Users’ Security Awareness. The security awareness of users is always a key to the security of digital
systems. A no-root user may not fully understand the purpose and consequence of the preprocessing
steps. In this case, an attacker may entice users to push malicious executables into their devices. For
example, an attacker may pretend to be a no-root application and instruct users to push an ADB binary
to mobile devices in the preprocessing steps. Using this ADB binary, the attacker can bypass our
permission-based solution and exploit the dark side analysed in this paper. Therefore, it is helpful to
educate users to understand the purpose and consequence of the operations they perform on their devices.
On the other hand, smartphone manufacturers may leverage on SELinux/SEAndroid to prevent such
breach by defining access policies to restrict the execution of untrusted executable files pushed in by
ADB shell. Under the premise that users are willing to adopt the no-root approach, the best protection is
to ensure that the no-root approach is indeed used by the no-root app instead of any other apps.
Google’s Solution. After we verify that the no-root approach can work on Android versions from 4.0.4
to 5.1.1, which is the latest version at that time, we reported to Google about the feasible no-root approach
along with its dark side in August 2015. Google admitted soon that the no-root approach can work as
intended, and so do the exploits on its dark side. Later in October 2015, Google removed the ADB client
and ADB server from the release of Android 6.0. These two components are responsible for accepting
debug commands and communicating with the ADB daemon, respectively. Therefore, an Android device
cannot be used to debug other Android devices. In contrast, the permission-based solution we propose
in Section 5.1 prevents ADB client from being misused while keeping the debugger functionality, which
could be more desirable in practice.
6. Related Works
In this section, we summarize the related works and compare them with ours.
ADB is the official debugging tool provided by Android. A set of ADB based attacks has been
identified before. Vidas et al. [32] mentioned in their survey that an untrusted ADB connection via USB
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could result in security breaches when an attacker is physically close to the target device. Recently,
Symantec detected a Windows malware which may infect Android devices with ADB [33] via USB
connections. Hwang et al. [30] presented some feasible stealthy operations which can be performed
within ADB capabilities by enumerating a series of attacks. Such attacks cannot be easily identified
because they take advantage of normal ADB commands. Different from these works, we propose a
feasible no-root approach that based on ADB loopback which is due to the available of the ADB client
and the ADB TCP mode newly added in Android. If this no-root approach is adopted for any reason on
an Android device with ADB, it brings along the dark side that all the ADB capabilities are available to
any app with the internet permission on the standalone device, including those contributed to the attacks
identified by Hwang et al. [30]. The typical exploits of this no-root approach are complementary to the
ADB based attacks identified before in terms of providing a better understanding on how ADB can be
misused.
Previous research has shown that some existing no-root applications can be misused or attacked. Lin
et al. [10] attacked some existing no-root screenshot apps and abused their screenshot functionalities. It
was shown that user input can be inferred by analysing the screenshots taken by these apps. In this paper,
to explore the dark side of the new no-root approach, we also identify a user input inference exploit,
for which the characters of user input can be obtained. In addition, the good timing detection algorithm,
Algorithm 1, can be used to capture the exact time point when a user is ready to input his/her account
credentials.
Developers’ negligence in code regulation leads to various attacks. It is demonstrated in previous
research [18] that a malicious app can read SMS, obtain contacts and access location by selectively
reading the system logs in earlier versions of Android. However, this attack cannot work on Android 4.1
and later versions, since on these new versions, an app is restricted to read its own log only. Nonetheless,
it is still not a secure way to log sensitive information. In this paper, we show that despite the restriction
enforced since Android 4.1, the system-wide log is available to any apps with the internet permission on
the device due to the exploit of this new no-root approach. We examine the usage of log on top-listed
real-world apps. We discover that many of them still log informative data which leads to severe privacy
leakage.
Developer’s negligence in attribute configuration also leads to various attacks. Davi et al. [14] showed
that malicious apps can escalate their granted permissions due to the misconfiguration of component
attribute “exported” in victim apps. Zhou et al. [34] disclosed a type of passive content leakage on
Android as a result of improper true “exported” value of content providers. Instead of focusing on the
component attribute “exported”, we evaluate the use of the application attributes “allowBackup” and
“debuggable” in apps collected from Google Play and four third-party markets. It is shown that the
configuration of “allowBackup” with true or default value along with the lack of necessary protection on
backup data leads to the account takeover. The misconfiguration of “debuggable” leads to the application
UID abuse, which is prohibited in Google Play but still can be discovered in all of the markets we test.
About the protection of ADB capabilities, it is proposed that the ADB server should add certain
authentication so as to make sure its functionalities can only be invoked by the original ADB client [30].
Different from this work, we emphasise on the protection of the ADB client in the mitigation part since
the ADB loopback exposes the ADB client to a wide range of apps with the internet permission. We
propose a permission-based solution to prevent the misuse of the ADB client, which allows only those
apps with granted ADB permission to access the ADB client.
Loosely related to our evaluation of vulnerable apps in different markets, the health condition of
third-party markets has been measured in previous research. For example, Zhou et al. [35] studied
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the repackaging problem in third-party markets. They discovered that repackaged apps either steal
advertisement revenue or add malicious payload, both of which contribute to an unhealthy and unfair
market. DroidRanger [36] showed that the malware ratio is 10 to 23.5 times higher in third-party markets
than Google Play. Consistent to the previous research, we discover that third-party markets enforce less
restrictions on publishing “debuggable” apps in comparison with Google Play.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a new feasible no-root approach working on Android devices. This no-root
approach has its advantage of performing privileged operations based on ADB loopback instead of a
separate service as in other no-root approaches. To ensure that this no-root approach is not misused in a
proactive instead of reactive manner, we investigate the dark-side exploits of it, and evaluate them with
a large number of apps downloaded from Google Play and four third-party markets. We discover that a
large number of apps are vulnerable to the exploits, and that the exploits are due to not only the ADB
loopback but also the negligence of app developers and app markets. We further attempt to mitigate
the exploits from different perspectives, including proposing a permission-based solution and providing
suggestions to app developers and app markets.
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Appendix
Table 7: Permissions and protection levels of shell on Android 5.1.0.
Pemission name Protection level
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION dangerous
ACCESS_CONTENT_PROVIDERS_EXTERNALLY signature
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION dangerous
ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS normal
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE normal
ACCESS_SURFACE_FLINGER signature
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE normal
BACKUP signatureOrSystem
BATTERY_STATS signatureOrSystem
BIND_APPWIDGET signatureOrSystem
BLUETOOTH dangerous
BLUETOOTH_STACK signature
BROADCAST_STICKY normal
CALL_PHONE dangerous
CHANGE_CONFIGURATION signatureOrSystem
CLEAR_APP_USER_DATA signature
DELETE_CACHE_FILES signatureOrSystem
DELETE_PACKAGES signatureOrSystem
DEVICE_POWER signature
DUMP signatureOrSystem
EXPAND_STATUS_BAR normal
FORCE_BACK signature
FORCE_STOP_PACKAGES signatureOrSystem
FRAME_STATS signature
GET_ACCOUNTS normal
GET_DETAILED_TASKS signature
GRANT_REVOKE_PERMISSIONS signature
INJECT_EVENTS signature
INSTALL_LOCATION_PROVIDER signatureOrSystem
INSTALL_PACKAGES signatureOrSystem
INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS signatureOrSystem
INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL signature
INTERNAL_SYSTEM_WINDOW signature
KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES normal
MANAGE_DEVICE_ADMINS signatureOrSystem
MANAGE_USERS signatureOrSystem
MODIFY_APPWIDGET_BIND_PERMISSIONS signatureOrSystem
READ_CALENDAR dangerous
READ_CONTACTS dangerous
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE normal
READ_FRAME_BUFFER signatureOrSystem
READ_USER_DICTIONARY dangerous
REAL_GET_TASKS signatureOrSystem
REORDER_TASKS normal
RETRIEVE_WINDOW_CONTENT signatureOrSystem
RETRIEVE_WINDOW_TOKEN signature
SEND_SMS dangerous
SET_ACTIVITY_WATCHER signature
Continued on next page
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Table 7 – continued from previous page
Pemission name Protection level
SET_ALWAYS_FINISH signatureOrSystem
SET_ANIMATION_SCALE signatureOrSystem
SET_DEBUG_APP signatureOrSystem
SET_KEYBOARD_LAYOUT signature
SET_ORIENTATION signature
SET_PROCESS_LIMIT signatureOrSystem
SET_SCREEN_COMPATIBILITY signature
SIGNAL_PERSISTENT_PROCESSES signatureOrSystem
STOP_APP_SWITCHES signatureOrSystem
UPDATE_APP_OPS_STATS signatureOrSystem
WRITE_CALENDAR dangerous
WRITE_CONTACTS dangerous
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE dangerous
WRITE_MEDIA_STORAGE signatureOrSystem
WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS signatureOrSystem
WRITE_SETTINGS normal
WRITE_USER_DICTIONARY normal
